TY - JOUR
T1 - Alternative health insurance schemes
T2 - a welfare comparison
AU - Keiding, Hans
AU - Hansen, Bodil O.
N1 - JEL Classification: I19, G22
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - In this paper, we present a simple model of health insurance with asymmetric information, where we compare two alternative ways of organizing the insurance market. Either as a competitive insurance market, where some risks remain uninsured, or as a compulsory scheme, where however, the level of reimbursement of loss is to be determined by majority decision. In a simple welfare comparison, the compulsory scheme may in certain environments yield a solution which is inferior to that obtained in the market. We further consider the situation where the compulsory scheme may be supplemented by voluntary competitive insurance; this situation turns out to be at least as good as either of the alternatives
AB - In this paper, we present a simple model of health insurance with asymmetric information, where we compare two alternative ways of organizing the insurance market. Either as a competitive insurance market, where some risks remain uninsured, or as a compulsory scheme, where however, the level of reimbursement of loss is to be determined by majority decision. In a simple welfare comparison, the compulsory scheme may in certain environments yield a solution which is inferior to that obtained in the market. We further consider the situation where the compulsory scheme may be supplemented by voluntary competitive insurance; this situation turns out to be at least as good as either of the alternatives
U2 - 10.1016/S0167-6296(02)00062-0
DO - 10.1016/S0167-6296(02)00062-0
M3 - Journal article
VL - 21
SP - 739
EP - 756
JO - Journal of Health Economics
JF - Journal of Health Economics
SN - 0167-6296
IS - 5
ER -