Chimpanzees' socially maintained food preferences indicate both conservatism and conformity

LM Hopper, Steve Schapiro, SP Lambeth, SF Brosnan

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    99 Citationer (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Chimpanzees remain fixed on a single strategy, even if a novel, more efficient, strategy is introduced.
    Previous studies reporting such findings have incorporated paradigms in which chimpanzees learn one
    behavioural method and then are shown a new one that the chimpanzees invariably do not adopt. This
    study provides the first evidence that chimpanzees show such conservatism even when the new method
    employs the identical required behaviour as the first, but for a different reward. Groups of chimpanzees
    could choose to exchange one of two types of inedible tokens, with each token type being associated with
    a different food reward: one type was rewarded with a highly preferred food (grape) and the other type
    was rewarded with a less preferred food (carrot). Individuals first observed a model chimpanzee from their
    social group trained to choose one of the two types of tokens. In one group, this token earned a carrot,
    while in the other, control, group the token earned a grape. In both groups, chimpanzees conformed to the
    trained model’s choice. This was especially striking for those gaining the pieces of carrot, the less favoured
    reward. This resulted in a population-level trend of food choices, even when counter to their original,
    individual, preferences. Moreover, the chimpanzees’ food preferences did not change over time, demonstrating
    that these results were not due to a simple shift in preferences. We discuss social factors apparent
    in the interactions and suggest that, despite seeming to be inefficient, in chimpanzees, conformity may
    benefit them, possibly by assisting with the maintenance of group relations.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftAnimal Behaviour
    Vol/bind81
    Udgave nummer6
    Sider (fra-til)1195-1122
    Antal sider27
    ISSN0003-3472
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - jun. 2011

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