Coercive Sanctions and International Conflicts: A Sociological Theory

Perhaps the most common question raised in the literature on coercive international sanctions is: "Do sanctions work?" Unsurprisingly, the answer to such a sweeping question remains inconclusive.

Instead of asking whether sanctions work, this book addresses a more basic question: How do coercive international sanctions work, and more substantially, what are the social conditions within sanctions conflicts that are conducive to either cooperation or non-cooperation? Arguing that coercive sanctions and international conflicts are socially-constructed facts, the book explores the processes involved in the formation of meaning that sanctions and conflicts acquire. From a sociological perspective, the answer to the question depends on the meaning that sanctions acquire for opponents in on-going conflict. On the other hand, sanctions contribute differently to the way in which opponents construct conflict, and to its potential transformation. Thus it is premature to ‘predict’ the political effectiveness of sanctions simply on the basis of their economic impact.

The book presents analyses of the sanctions conflicts between China and Taiwan and over Iran’s nuclear program, illustrating how negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and their combination made a distinct contribution to conflict development and prospects for cooperation.