Abstract
We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms, in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | European Journal of Operational Research |
| Vol/bind | 304 |
| Udgave nummer | 2 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 851-864 |
| Antal sider | 14 |
| ISSN | 0377-2217 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 2023 |
Bibliografisk note
Funding Information:We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for useful comments. This work is supported by the Center for Blockchains and Electronic Markets funded by the Carlsberg Foundation under grant no. CF18-1112.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 The Author(s)