Family Firms and Labor Market Regulation

Morten Bennedsen, Sterling Huang, Hannes F. Wagner*, Stefan Zeume

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

12 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms' performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftThe Review of Corporate Finance Studies
Vol/bind8
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)348-379
ISSN2046-9128
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 21 jun. 2019

Citationsformater