TY - JOUR
T1 - Nudge for (the public) good
T2 - how defaults can affect cooperation
AU - Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt
AU - Piovesan, Marco
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default.
AB - In this paper we test the effect of non-binding defaults on the level of contribution to a public good. We manipulate the default numbers appearing on the decision screen to nudge subjects toward a free-rider strategy or a perfect conditional cooperator strategy. Our results show that the vast majority of our subjects did not adopt the default numbers, but their stated strategy was affected by the default. Moreover, we find that our manipulation spilled over to a subsequent repeated public goods game where default was not manipulated. Here we found that subjects who previously saw the free rider default were significantly less cooperative than those who saw the perfect conditional cooperator default.
U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0145488
DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0145488
M3 - Journal article
C2 - 26717569
VL - 10
JO - PLoS ONE
JF - PLoS ONE
SN - 1932-6203
IS - 12
M1 - e0145488
ER -