Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Ola Andersson; Matteo Galizzi; Tim Hoppe; Sebastian Kranz; Karen van der Wiel; Erik Roland Wengström

Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Ola Andersson, Matteo Galizzi, Tim Hoppe, Sebastian Kranz, Karen van der Wiel, Erik Roland Wengström

Økonomisk Institut

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

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Abstract

This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Antal sider	8
Status	Udgivet - 2008

Bibliografisk note

JEL classification: C72, C91, D83

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PDFForlagets udgivne version, 293 KB

Citationsformater

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AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

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