Second Thoughts on Free Riding

Ulrik Haagen Nielsen; Jean-Robert Karl Tyran; Erik Roland Wengström

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021

Second Thoughts on Free Riding

Ulrik Haagen Nielsen, Jean-Robert Karl Tyran, Erik Roland Wengström

Økonomisk Institut

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

50 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Economics Letters
Vol/bind	122
Udgave nummer	2
Sider (fra-til)	136-139
Antal sider	4
ISSN	0165-1765
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021
Status	Udgivet - 2014

Bibliografisk note

JEL Classification: C70; C90 ;D03

Emneord

Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021

Citationsformater

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abstract = "We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma",

keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Response time , Free riding, Public goods, Experiment",

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AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

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N2 - We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma

AB - We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Response time

KW - Free riding

KW - Public goods

KW - Experiment

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.021

M3 - Journal article

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