Abstract
Beliefs about collective outcomes play an important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, we investigate whether self-serving biases in information processing—documented for beliefs about individual outcomes—affect beliefs about collective outcomes. In a first study, we find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases are similar to biases for individual outcomes. We also observe that the presence of a market institution for aggregating private information produces, if anything, slightly greater collective self-delusion. In a second study, we investigate the mechanisms driving collective self-delusion and find that anticipatory utility plays a large role, rather than ego-utility considerations.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Vol/bind | 153 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 315-344 |
| Antal sider | 30 |
| ISSN | 0899-8256 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 2025 |
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