Substitute for Victory: Performance Measurements in Vietnam, The Gulf War, and Afghanistan

Why have performance measurements been introduced to the domain of war a number of times in the last century? Have performance measurements reappeared because they possess distinct analytical potentials with regard to strategic decision-making and the planning and execution of military campaigns?
In this thesis Kristian Knus Larsen provides a different answer. Larsen argues that performance measurements have been used by political decision-makers and military commands as a substitute for victory. Performance measurements have been used to handle a range of problems that have been only partly related to the battlefield. Political decision makers have used performance measurements to show the progress and success of wars to the media and to the general public. Performance measurements have been used by military commands to improve military operations and to evade political interference. These uses of performance measurements have resulted in problematic strategic dialogues between the political decision-makers and the military commands.
Larsen makes use of three cases to reach this conclusion, namely the Vietnam War, The first Gulf War, and the war in Afghanistan. In each case he investigates how performance measurements were implemented in the military campaign, how the political decision-makers and the military commands observed performance measurements, and what implications the use of performance measurements had on the military campaign.