Abstract
The most blatant forms of discrimination are morally outrageous and very obviously so; but the nature and boundaries of discrimination are more controversial, and it is not clear whether all forms of discrimination are morally bad; nor is it clear why objectionable cases of discrimination are bad. In this paper I address these issues. First, I offer a taxonomy of discrimination. I then argue that discrimination is bad, when it is, because it harms people. Finally, I criticize a rival, disrespect-based account according to which discrimination is bad regardless of whether it causes harm.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |
Vol/bind | 9 |
Udgave nummer | 2 |
Sider (fra-til) | 167-185 |
Antal sider | 18 |
ISSN | 1386-2820 |
Status | Udgivet - 2006 |