The Distortive Effects of Too Big To Fail: Evidence from the Danish Market for Retail Deposits

Rajkamal Iyer; Thais Lærkholm Jensen; Niels Johannesen; Adam Francis McSorley Sheridan

doi:10.1093/rfs/hhz037

The Distortive Effects of Too Big To Fail: Evidence from the Danish Market for Retail Deposits

Rajkamal Iyer, Thais Lærkholm Jensen, Niels Johannesen, Adam Francis McSorley Sheridan

Økonomisk Institut

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

16 Citationer (Scopus)

215 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study the impact of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) guarantees on the market for retail deposits. Exploiting information about all personal deposit accounts in Denmark and salient changes to the deposit insurance limit, we provide evidence that systemically important banks successfully retain and attract uninsured deposits in a crisis at the expense of other banks even as they differentially lower their interest rates. The funding shock suffered by nonsystemic banks causes a decrease in their lending. The results point to the distortive effects of TBTF guarantees in the market for retail deposits.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	The Review of Financial Studies
Vol/bind	32
Udgave nummer	12
Sider (fra-til)	4653–4695
ISSN	0893-9454
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz037
Status	Udgivet - 15 mar. 2019

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1093/rfs/hhz037

The Distortive Effects of Too Big To Fail: Evidence from the Danish Market for Retail DepositsAccepteret manuskript, 1,74 MB

Citationsformater

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AB - We study the impact of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) guarantees on the market for retail deposits. Exploiting information about all personal deposit accounts in Denmark and salient changes to the deposit insurance limit, we provide evidence that systemically important banks successfully retain and attract uninsured deposits in a crisis at the expense of other banks even as they differentially lower their interest rates. The funding shock suffered by nonsystemic banks causes a decrease in their lending. The results point to the distortive effects of TBTF guarantees in the market for retail deposits.

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