What is distinctive about the Second Person?: A Phenomenological Approach to its Normative Significance

Julia Zaenker

What is distinctive about the Second Person? A Phenomenological Approach to its Normative Significance

Julia Zaenker

Institut for Kommunikation

Publikation: Bog/antologi/afhandling/rapport › Ph.d.-afhandling

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Abstract

Mange har hævdet, at anden-persons-perspektivet er en nøgle til forståelsen af vores mellemmenneskelige relationers komplekse dynamikker og nogle har derudover også understreget den teoretiske og etisk transformative kraft som den Dialogiske tilgang til filosofien besidder. Imidlertid gør disse ambitiøse tilgange det ofte vanskeligt at afgøre, hvad der egentlig berettiger en særskilt undersøgelse af anden-persons-perspektivet.
Denne afhandling argumenterer for, at en fænomenologisk metode kan afdække vigtige nuancer af, hvad det vil sige at vende sig mod en anden i en anden-personlig henvendelse. Disse nuancer bliver ofte overset eller sammenblandet i den bredere filosofiske debat. Jeg hævder, at anden-persons-fænomenet manifesterer sig på en distinkt måde i erfaringen og at det er afgørende for en korrekt forståelse af vores sociale livsverden og for mulighederne for både tale og diskurs. Samtidig advarer jeg mod at overvurdere anden-persons-tilgangenes transformative potentiale i forhold til at fungere som nye paradigmer, for eksempel inden for moralfilosofien eller den politiske filosofi.
For at udvikle min Distinktivistiske tilgang til anden-persons-perspektivet skelner jeg mellem forskellige (proto-)normative elementer i anden-persons-relationen, som de kommer til udtryk i fænomenologiske beskrivelser af den intersubjektive erfaring. Med udgangspunkt i begrebet sociale handlinger hos Reinach og Husserl udforsker jeg to forskellige typer normativitet, der enten er blevet ignoreret eller overset i moderne arbejde med disse klassiske ressourcer. Reinachs formelle tilgang til den forbindelse der etableres i anden-personlige henvendelser har paralleller til aktuel forskning vedrørende talehandlingers normativitet. Derimod fremhæver Husserls perspektiv på det anden-personlige engagement qua intersubjektiv involvering snarere hvordan vi oplever en særlig form for medafhængighed af andre.
På trods af min påstand om, at en genovervejelse af Reinach og Husserl er særdeles produktiv for den nutidige debat, vurderer jeg også, at begges tilgang til sociale handlinger har en tendens til at operere med en for suveræn positionering af taleren. For helt at kunne værdsætte primatet af vores praktiske, performative tilgang til andre foreslår jeg at ændre fokusset til vores erfaring af selv at blive adresseret af andres krav og appel. Dette afdækker endnu et særdeles relevant strukturelt moment i vores erfaring af at være afhængige af andre.
Ved at fremhæve disse strukturelle momenter i erfaringen tilbyder afhandlingen ikke blot en nuanceret fænomenologisk analyse af anden-persons-fænomenet, den peger også på en ny måde at forstå det normative potentiale i anden-persons-relationer. I stedet for at tage udgangspunkt i traditionelle normative begreber som retfærdighed, ansvar eller moralsk respekt, reflekterer jeg over, hvordan mere subtile (proto)-normative dynamikker i anden-persons-fænomenet ligger til grund for disse begreber. Denne afhandling bidrager således både til den filosofiske debat om anden-persons-perspektivet og til de aktuelle metodologiske diskussioner om fænomenologiske tilgange til normativitet.

Originalsprog	Engelsk

Forlag	Københavns Universitet
Antal sider	236
Status	Udgivet - 4 jan. 2025

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Citationsformater

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title = "What is distinctive about the Second Person?: A Phenomenological Approach to its Normative Significance",

abstract = "Many have claimed that the second person is key to understanding the intricate dynamics of our interpersonal relations, with some emphasizing the theoretically and ethically transformative power of a Dialogical approach to philosophy. However, these bolder second-person approaches make it hard to discern what actually warrants an inquiry into the second person as a distinct phenomenon in the first place.This dissertation argues that a phenomenological method can uncover important nuances of what it means to turn oneself towards another in second-personal address. These nuances are often overlooked or conflated in the wider philosophical debate. I contend that the second-person phenomenon manifests distinctively in experience and is crucial for how we make sense of our social lifeworld and the possibilities of speech and discourse. At the same time, I caution against overstating the transformative potential of second-person approaches as new paradigms, for instance in moral or political philosophy.To advance my distinctivist approach to the second person, I discern different (proto)-normative moments of the second-person relation as they intersect withphenomenological descriptions of intersubjective experience. Drawing on the notion of social acts in Reinach and Husserl, I explore two different kinds of normativity that have either been ignored or overlooked in contemporary work on these older resources: Reinach{\textquoteright}s formal approach to the nexus of second-personal address parallels contemporary work on the normativity of speech acts. By contrast, Husserl{\textquoteright}s perspective on second-personal engagement as intersubjective involvement highlights how we experience a particular kind of co-dependency on others.Despite my insistence that reconsidering Reinach and Husserl is highly productive for the contemporary debate, I diagnose that both approaches to social acts tend towards a too sovereign conception of the speaker. To fully appreciate the primacy of our practical, performative access to others, I propose shifting attention to the experience of being addressed by the claims and appeals of others. This uncovers second-personal responsiveness as yet another highly relevant structural moment involved in our experience of depending on others.By highlighting these structural moments in experience, this dissertation not only offers a nuanced phenomenological analysis of the second-person phenomenon but also points towards a new way to grasp the normative significance of second-person relations. Rather than starting from traditional normative concepts such as justice, responsibility, or moral respect, I propose reflecting on how more subtle (proto)-normative dynamics of the second-person phenomenon underpin these concepts. This work contributes to both the philosophical discourse on the second person and the recently emerged methodological debate surrounding phenomenological approaches to normativity.",

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