A Pandemic Instrument Can Start Turning Collective Problems into Collective Solutions by Governing the Common-Pool Resource of Antimicrobial Effectiveness

Isaac Weldon*, Kathleen Liddell, Susan Rogers Van Katwyk, Steven J. Hoffman, Timo Minssen, Kevin Outterson, Stephanie Palmer, Adrian Viens, Jorge Viñuales

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)
41 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Literature on antimicrobial resistance (AMR) has grown enormously in the last 10 years. While this growth is welcomed overall, the sudden rise in AMR literature makes it difficult for time-pressured policymakers to gather and grasp all the necessary information, concepts, and controversies relevant for treaty negotiation. In this paper, we present two tools from social science to simplify the policymaking challenge: first, a problem synthesis framework, which itemizes the full range of governance challenges around global antimicrobial resistance (section 1); and second, a theoretical framework drawing on collective action theory, which can help signal toward potential solutions (section 2). Policy makers can leverage these tools when considering how to include AMR in the pandemic treaty.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Law, Medicine & Ethics
Volume50
Issue numberS2 (Winter 2022) - published March 2023
Pages (from-to)17-25
Number of pages9
ISSN1073-1105
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022

Keywords

  • Faculty of Law
  • antimircobial resistence
  • pandemic treaty
  • law

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