An EM misreading of Deleuze: Towards Post-praxiology?

I know many of you will disagree with me on this topic. Some might say that I am pushing ethnomethodology to the border. Perhaps I will say that I, in this presentation, am arguing for going a step further, leaving the pureness of ethnomethodology unspoiled and instead suggesting a new thing which I gloss over as post-praxiology. This paper has two audiences: 1) EMCA scholars who know EM. Here, I suggest radicalising the ethnomethodological plenum and revitalising (process) questions of ontology; 2) to Social theory scholars who know new materialism, I argue for the need for practical EM respecifications and commitment to empirical phenomena. Here, the argument is for revitalising the power of EM in social theory / new materialist context in and through the misreading of Deleuze. The role of ontology in EM: towards a process plenum There are off cause a set of assumptions and hence also what we can call an ontology in Ethnomethodology-although many are reluctant to agree. As I read it, Garfinkel uses the term "plenum" to designate such basic assumptions. I take it that he uses it in the sense known from physics to describe a spatial plenum-space filled with matter-as such, it can mean the most basic unit of understanding or principles in a theory or basic assumptions. On the one hand, we reject invocating an external or transcendental matrix. But on the other hand, we still need Ethnomethodology's plenum: Garfinkel: "For what I want to get at, the question is not, what does plenum mean? And not, how is plenum to be defined? But who needs a plenum? I don't mean its not needed. (my emphasis)