Abstract
Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, such as Miranda Fricker's concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice; additionally, I differentiate my view from Kristie Dotson's account of testimonial smothering. I argue, ultimately, that anticipatory epistemic injustice is a useful addition to our current taxonomy of epistemic injustices, as it has promising explanatory potential for a range of non-standard cases of epistemic injustice.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Social Epistemology |
Volume | 35 |
Issue number | 6 |
Pages (from-to) | 564-576 |
Number of pages | 13 |
ISSN | 0269-1728 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Keywords
- Epistemic injustice
- testimonial injustice
- self-silencing
- testimonial smothering