Abstract
I argue against various versions of the 'attitude' view of consent and of the 'action' view of consent: I show that neither an attitude nor an action is either necessary or sufficient for consent. I then put forward a different view of consent based on the idea that, given a legitimate epistemic context, absence of dissent is sufficient for consent: what is crucial is having access to dissent. In the latter part of the paper I illustrate my view of consent by applying it to the case of consenting to being an organ donor.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Monash Bioethics Review |
Volume | 34 |
Issue number | 1 |
Pages (from-to) | 3-22 |
Number of pages | 20 |
ISSN | 1321-2753 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2016 |
Keywords
- Journal Article