Abstract
We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms, in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.
Original language | English |
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Journal | European Journal of Operational Research |
Volume | 304 |
Issue number | 2 |
Pages (from-to) | 851-864 |
Number of pages | 14 |
ISSN | 0377-2217 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2022 The Author(s)
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Consistency
- Decentralized mechanisms
- Game theory
- Implementation