Abstract
Ascribing autonomous status to agents is a valuable practice. As such, we ought to care about how we engage in practices of autonomy ascription. However, disagreement between first-personal experiences of an agent's autonomy and third-personal determinations of their autonomy presents challenges of ethical and epistemic concern. My view is that insights from a dialogical rather than nondialogical account of autonomy give us the resources to combat the challenges associated with autonomy ascription. I draw on Andrea Westlund's account of dialogical autonomy-on which autonomy requires a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external critical perspectives-to make my case.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Hypatia |
Volume | 37 |
Issue number | 1 |
Pages (from-to) | 97-110 |
Number of pages | 14 |
ISSN | 0887-5367 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2022 |