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Equilibrium Arrivals to a Last-come First-served Preemptive-resume Queue

  • Jesper Breinbjerg
  • , Trine Tornøe Platz
  • , Lars Peter Østerdal

Research output: Working paper › Research

Abstract

We consider a queueing system where a single server opens and serves users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). A finite number of strategic users must choose individually when to arrive at the server. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. Based on the constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium, we provide a numerical example in which we compute the symmetric equilibrium strategy and compare the resulting social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherDepartment of Economics, Copenhagen Business School
Number of pages30
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes
SeriesWorking Paper, Department of Economics Copenhagen Business School
Number17-2020

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