May we eat our fellow creatures? Virtues and animal ethics

A fundamental question in animal ethics is whether it is morally acceptable to eat animals. Cora Diamond rejects the relevance of moral status-approaches, arguing that the crucial fact is that we have moral relations with animals as our fellow creatures. This resonates well with virtue ethical approaches, understood as a matter of having the right attitude towards ourselves and others. But can Diamond’s approach provide us with an answer to the question whether it is wrong to eat non-human animals or – if it is acceptable – under which circumstances we may eat them? A virtue ethical argument for veganism holds that industrial meat production is by necessity cruel and partaking in it is not virtuous. Diamond agrees that fellow creatures should not be regarded as stages in the production of a meat product but she admits that this attitude to animals as worthy of respect and compassion does not necessarily lead to veganism. We suggest that one possible case of virtuous non-veganism is eating domestic animals that lead good lives and are humanely slaughtered. Another could be eating wild animals that could be worse off unless some of them are killed through humane hunting practices. But is that really compatible with relating to them as fellow creatures? Two seemingly incompatible implications can be drawn from Diamond’s analysis of the special character of human-animal relationships. Either: animals should never be eaten because we recognise them as fellow creatures and potential companions. Or: we should only eat meat under circumstances where we can pay respect to the kind of relationship we have with the particular creatures. We work out these two positions, and leave it open for further discussion whether both of them can be expressive of a virtuous life with animals as fellow creatures.