Abstract
Recently a number of authors have appealed to the early works of Merleau-Ponty in a critique of the picture of perception presented by McDowell. This debate has been focused on McDowell’s claim that conceptual capacities are essentially involved in our perceptual experiences. In this paper I wish to draw attention to what I consider an additional potentially fruitful meeting point between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell, namely their critique of a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. My aim is to demonstrate how both authors regard a certain conception of nature rather than some independent epistemological project as the background assumption which gives the Cartesian picture its attraction. Furthermore I want to bring out how they share a general conception of the nature of the problem generated by this background assumption. They both regard the problem as a transcendental problem as opposed to a merely epistemological problem
Translated title of the contribution | McDowell and Merleau-Ponty on the Cartesian Picture of the Mind |
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Original language | Japanese |
Journal | Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan |
Volume | 28 |
Pages (from-to) | 1-10 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Humanities