Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

Peter Fristrup; Hans Keiding

doi:10.1007/s003550050117

Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

Peter Fristrup, Hans Keiding

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function

Original language	English
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	15
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	455-467
ISSN	0176-1714
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050117
Publication status	Published - 1998

Access to Document

10.1007/s003550050117

Cite this

@article{ab8469d074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,

title = "Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions",

abstract = "This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function",

author = "Peter Fristrup and Hans Keiding",

year = "1998",

doi = "10.1007/s003550050117",

language = "English",

volume = "15",

pages = "455--467",

journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",

issn = "0176-1714",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions

AU - Fristrup, Peter

AU - Keiding, Hans

PY - 1998

Y1 - 1998

N2 - This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function

AB - This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function

U2 - 10.1007/s003550050117

DO - 10.1007/s003550050117

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

SP - 455

EP - 467

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

IS - 3

ER -