Abstract
I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
Translated title of the contribution | Motorisk Intentionalitet og Tilfældet Schneider |
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Original language | English |
Journal | Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences |
Volume | 8 |
Issue number | 3 |
Pages (from-to) | 371-388 |
Number of pages | 18 |
ISSN | 1568-7759 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sep 2009 |