Recognising psychological suffering in adjudicating torture’s prohibition: Between precedent and practice at the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the UN Committee Against Torture

Psykisk smerte (og/eller lidelse) har skabt vanskeligheder for internationale menneskerettighedsadvokater og dommere, der arbejder med forbuddet mod tortur, umenneskelig og nedværdigende behandling. En undersøgelse af relevant international retspraksis afdækker stor variation i, hvorvidt psykisk smerte findes at overtræde forbuddet eller ej. Når det er blevet fremhævet i sager indbragt for Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol (ECtHR), Den Interamerikanske Menneskerettighedsdomstol (IACtHR) og FN's Komité mod Tortur (CAT), er psykologisk lidelse aldrig blevet specifikt kategoriseret som tortur. Psykisk smerte er ofte blevet ekskluderet og i stedet kategoriseret som "lovlige sanktioner" eller som "faldende under" tærsklen for "minimum af alvorsgrad", og der er derfor ikke blevet statueret krænkelse. Hvilke former for lidelse der er inkluderet eller ekskluderet, og hvordan de er kategoriseret under forbuddet – hvad er tilladt, og hvad er forbudt under international ret -, har indflydelse på, hvordan stater behandler dem, der er i deres varetægt. Den dogmatiske litteratur giver sparsomme forklaringer på denne kategorisering og i praksis eksklusion af psykologisk lidelse fra forbuddet mod tortur, umenneskelig og nedværdigende behandling.
Psychological suffering has posed difficulties for international human rights advocates andadjudicators working on the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Asystematic survey of the relevant international caselaw reveals a vast variation in howpsychological suffering is found to violate (or not) the prohibition. When singled out in casesbrought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights (IACtHR), and the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), psychologicalsuffering has never been specifically categorised as torture. What is more, psychologicalsuffering is often excluded altogether from the purview of the prohibition, categorised insteadas ‘lawful sanctions’ or as falling below the ‘minimum level of severity’ threshold, andtherefore not found to be a violation. The doctrinal scholarship offers scant explanations forthis categorisation and exclusion as evident in interpretive practice. Through the use ofcaselaw analysis and interviews, numerous inter-related reasons are revealed for thesepractices: that socio-political standards recognising the significance of psychologicalsuffering are selectively applied or altogether overlooked; that procedural pragmatismencourages caution and conservatism regarding categorisation; that scientific expertisedocumenting health impacts have not compelled adjudicators in all cases; and, thatinterpretation still depends on sense-centric reasoning (intuitionimpression-empathy)potentially undercutting scientific expertise and perpetuating preconceptions associatingsevere suffering with the physical.