TY - JOUR
T1 - Social inequality in health, responsibility and egalitarian justice
AU - Andersen, Martin Marchman
AU - Dalton, Susanne Oksbjerg
AU - Johansen, Christoffer
AU - Lynch, John
AU - Holtug, Nils
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - Are social inequalities in health unjust when brought about by differences in lifestyle? A widespread idea, luck egalitarianism, is that inequality stemming from individuals’ free choices is not to be considered unjust, since individuals, presumably, are themselves responsible for such choices. Thus, to the extent that lifestyles are in fact results of free choices, social inequality in health brought about by these choices is not in tension with egalitarian justice. If this is so, then it may put in question the justification of free and equal access to health care and existing medical research priorities. However, personal responsibility is a highly contested issue and in this article we first consider the case for, and second the case against, personal responsibility for health in light of recent developments in philosophical accounts of responsibility and equality. We suggest – but do not fully establish - that at the most fundamental level people are never responsible in such a way that appeals to individuals’ own responsibility can justify inequalities in health.
AB - Are social inequalities in health unjust when brought about by differences in lifestyle? A widespread idea, luck egalitarianism, is that inequality stemming from individuals’ free choices is not to be considered unjust, since individuals, presumably, are themselves responsible for such choices. Thus, to the extent that lifestyles are in fact results of free choices, social inequality in health brought about by these choices is not in tension with egalitarian justice. If this is so, then it may put in question the justification of free and equal access to health care and existing medical research priorities. However, personal responsibility is a highly contested issue and in this article we first consider the case for, and second the case against, personal responsibility for health in light of recent developments in philosophical accounts of responsibility and equality. We suggest – but do not fully establish - that at the most fundamental level people are never responsible in such a way that appeals to individuals’ own responsibility can justify inequalities in health.
U2 - 10.1093/pubmed/fdt012
DO - 10.1093/pubmed/fdt012
M3 - Journal article
C2 - 23436200
VL - 35
SP - 4
EP - 8
JO - Journal of Public Health
JF - Journal of Public Health
SN - 1741-3842
IS - 1
ER -